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THE HAGUE PEACE SYSTEM IN OPERATION 1
By James L. Tryon, Secretary of the Mlassachusetts Peace Society
When the First Hague Conference adjourned, it left the
signatory powers with a set of machinery for the prevention of
war. The conference was not an assembly of visionaries nor of
doctrinaires, but of practical men who worked on an historical
basis. It adopted as international law only such principles as had
previously been recognized, or were in process of recognition, by
the nations. It sanctioned, for the most part, only such pre-
ventive measures as had been proved to be, or were believed to
be, feasible. These were mediation, the international commission
of inquiry, and arbitration.
To go back no farther than 1794, international arbitration had
behind it about a century of history.2  Mediation, though for-
merly identified with interference and, therefore, out of favor,
had in recent years been effective in stopping wars, and the Con-
ference thought it could prevent them The international com-
mission of inquiry, although apparently an innovation, was not
really so: International commissions had surveyed and adjusted
boundary lines. The United States had gone so far in 1896 as to
appoint a national commission of examination into the merits of
a controversy between Venezuela and Great Britain over the
British-Guiana boundary. 4 It had also, in 1898, like Spain, ap-
pointed a board of naval officers to ascertain the cause of the
explosion of the battleship M1aine in Havana Harbor. Had an
international commission been appointed in the latter case, with
access to all the facts that both Spain and the United States could
have furnished in a joint effort to get at the truth, it is possible
that the result might have been different, although no reflection
is cast upon the spirit of the boards appointed, the conclusions
of which were contradictory, one assigning as the cause of the
L All rights reserved.
2 Darby's "International Tribunals," 769-9co. Instances of interna-
tional arbitration. Moore's International Arbitrations; 6 volumes. True-
blood's Arbitration at the Opening of the Twentieth Century.
Holls; i8o-i8i.
4For discussion of the use and theory of commissions: Holls; 203-
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wreck an external and the other an internal explosion.5 The
Hague Conference did not, however, set up a standing board of
inquiry. It simply proposed a method to be utilized in case of
emergency.
The untried feature of the system of mediation that was
adopted was that of seconding powers which should have charge,
for a time, of the affairs of two nations that were embroiled in
a controversy, and try to effect peace. MIr. Holls, who proposed
this measure, believed that it would hav been efficacious in
stopping the war between the United States and Spain. "After
the battle of Manila, and surely after the battle of Santiago," he
says, "the seconds could have convinced Spain that further
struggle was hopeless and that her honor (which in this case was
tla point in issue for her) had been amply vindicated." 1
The uniqueness of the scheme for arbitration was the inter-
national court, or panel, of judges from which a tribunal might
be chosen. This could be used as a substitute for mixed commis-
sions or for sovereigns acting as arbitrators, according to the
practice of the i 9 th century, but it did not entirely displace them;
for, with plenty of caution against rashness, the convention also
provided that a special tribunal might be created, other than from
the panel of the court, or that a sovereign might act as arbitrator.
The tribunal chosen to try a particular case might be constituted
so as to include members of the panel who were the appointees
or the nationals of the contending nations. The old way and the
new way were both recognized and nations were allowed to take
whichever they chose. This surely meant progress by evolution
rather than revolution, and was not a leap in the dark.
Of the three methods proposed for the prevention of war, none
of them was compulsory. The nations might resort to them or
not as they should see fit. The court had no other sanction to
enforce obedience to its decisions than public opinion and the
good faith of the litigant nations, which were, then, and are.
even now, regarded in some quarters as insufficient. Arbitration
was the only method that was legal in its nature; the international
commission of inquiry was moral; mediation was diplomatic.
'E. J. Benton's "International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-
.American [Var" 76-77, for a brief statement with references. Also 6
.Moore: International Law Digest, 181-184.
I Holls, before the Mohonk arbitration conference, Mohonk Report,
1900, 14.
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The mediator could not compel, he could only recommend peace.
His function ceased when his overtures were rejected, but these,
by agreement, were never to be regarded as unfriendly acts. Both
mediation and the international commission of inquiry, however,
were seen to be valuable adjuncts to an arbitral system. The em-
ployment of either in the settlement of international disputes
might result in an arbitration. The international commission
of inquiry was restricted to the elucidation of facts. It was not
to fix blame; it could not pronounce a decision having the effect
of an arbitral award; from its jurisdiction questions of national
honor and vital interest could be excluded; but it was a means of
referring to steady minds a question that, if left to the passionate
discussion of people in possession of but half the facts, or to
designing politicians tempted to pervert them, might result in
war. Recourse to it was like saying to the world: "Suspend all
judgment until you hear the report of the commission." The
measure was well calculated to prevent precipitous action.
The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes, although it was intended to be progressive, had about it
such possibilities of evasion and of failure that one might have
asked, and the world did ask, "Will this system work ?" A few
years of trial have silenced many of the doubts of skeptics and
more than justified the expectations of those who believed that
the plan would succeed. Iediation stopped the war between
Russia and Japan, one of the greatest wars of modern times.
The international commission of inquiry probably prevented an-
other war from breaking out at the same time between Russia
and Great Britain. The several cases tried by the Hague Court,
whatever evils they may have prevented, have settled issues that
diplomatists could not adjust to satisfaction, and which, in one
case, the Fisheries, had baffled the efforts of the wisest statesmen
in England and America for nearly a hundred years.
The system has been so successful that it has won the confidence
of the world, but it must and will be improved, in the light of
experience, by succeeding Hague Conferences until it is brought
,to perfection. In this work, every American publicist and lawyer
ought to have his honorable share. For the present, it is interest-
ing to observe how and to what extent the system, when put to
trial, has actually worked.
THE HAGUE PEACE SYSTEM
GOOD OFFICES OR MEDIATION.
Since the Hague Conferences have been held, and the Conven-
tion for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes has been
in effect, there have been no noteworthy cases in which 'good
offices and mediation have prevented a war, if we except the case
of Argentine and Chile who, when war threatened, were per-
suaded, to some extent by Great Britain, but also by noble
national leaders, to settle their boundary dispute by arbitration,7
or the peace of theMarblehead, an incident in which the United
States and Mexican governments arranged, on a United States
warship, a peaceful understanding between three Central Amer-
ican powers.' None of the parties about to engage in war
were, however, at the time signatories to the First Hague Con-
ference. Preventive mediation is still a matter of future develop-
ment, but progress is being made with it, especially by the
United States in Latin-America, in cases that are not known
to the world at large."
The most important of the recent cases of the use of good
offices and mediation among South American states has occurred
within a year in connection with a controversy between Peru and
Ecuador in regard to the ownership of a large area of land in the
valley of the Amazon. War threatened when the United States,
assisted by the governmcnts of the Argentine Republic and
Brazil. used their influence and brought about peace. All the
parties concerned, mediators and contestants, are signatories to
the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes, which fact in this case was used to advantage.
The United States government was asked by the Boers to
tender its good offices in bringing to a close the South African
war, but its overtures were declined by Great Britain. The best
For a brief story of the threatened war between Argentine and
Chile, see "The Christ of the .hndes"; American Peace Society, I910. For
additional information on the arbitration, see Colonel Sir Thomas Hunger-
ford Holdich: The Countries of the King's Award. The award of King
Edward, the arbitrator. was made in 1902. For further references, see
Darby, 914.
-qAmerican Journal of International Law. I: 141.
f, For recent efforts of the United States government to preserve peace
among Latin-American countries by use of its good offices, see speech by
Honorable David J. Foster, late Chairman of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs: Congressional Record, 62 Congress, first session. 4403.
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illustration, however, of the successful use of good offices to stop
a war, since the Hague Conference has been established, and
perhaps the best in all modern history, is that afforded by the
example of President Roosevelt, who, at an opportune moment,
came as a mediating friend between Russia and Japan. If the
mediatory methods suggested by the Hague Conferences had
nothing else to -recommend them to those who are asked to believe
in the possibility of preventive mediation than this instance
alone, they would still hold out encouragement to humanity to
have faith in their final utility. President Roosevelt's famous
message addressed to the ministers of the United States at St.
Petersburg and Tokyo, dated June 8th, 1905, reads:
The President feels that the time has come when in the inter-
est of all mankind he must endeavor to see if it is not possible
to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable conflict now being
waged. With both Russia and Japan the United States has in-
herited ties of friendship and good will. It hopes for the pros-
perity and welfare of each, and it feels that the progress of the
world is set back by the war between these two great nations.
The President accordingly urges the Russian and Japanese
Governments, not only for their own sakes, but in the interest of
the whole civilized world, to open direct negotiations for peace
with one another. The President suggests that these peace nego-
tiations be conducted directly and exclusively between the bel-
ligerents; in other words, that there may be a meeting of Russian
and Japanese plenipotentiaries or delegates without any inter-
mediary, in order to see if it is not possible for these repre-
sentatives of the two powers to agree to teryns of peace. The
President earnestly asks that the Russian (Japanese) Govern-
ment do now agree to such meeting, and in asking the Japanese
(Russian) Government likewise to agree.
While the President does not feel that any intermediary should
be called in in respect to the peace negotiations themselves, he is
entirely willing to do what he properly can, if the two powers
concerned feel that his services will be of aid in arranging the
preliminaries as to the time and place of meeting. But if even
these preliminaries can be arranged directly between the two
powers, or in any other way, the President will be glad, as his
sole purpose is to bring about a meeting which the whole civilized
world will pray may result in peace.
This communication led, in due time, to an agreement between
Russia and Japan to appoint plenipotentiaries. As will be re-
membered, they signed at Portsmouth, N. H., August 23d, Sep-
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tember 5th, 1905, a treaty of peace, called the treaty of
Portsmouth.,,
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY.
The general principles of the international commission of in-
quiry are contained in Article 9 on this subject, in the Hague Con-
vention of 19o7, which is substantially the same as that adopted'
in 1899. The article says:
In differences of an international nature involving neither
honor nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion
on points of fact, the contracting powers deem it expedient and
desirable that the parties who have not been able to come to an
agreement by means of diplomacy, should, as far as circumstances
allow, institute an international commission of inquiry, to facili-
tate a solution of these disputes by elucidating the facts by means
of an impartial and conscientious investigation.
The working of this measure may be clearly seen in the history
of the North Sea incident.
During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Baltic fleet was
coaling off the coast of Norway, preparatory to going to the Far
East to participate in the war with Japan. News came (October
20, 19o4) to the Russian Admiral in command that Japanese
torpedo boats had been seen in the vicinity. The admiral took
alarm. He ordered his fleet to sea twenty-four hours before the
expected time of its departure. It proceeded in several divisions.
As the leading division was passing through the North Sea in the
night, it passed a fleet of fishing boats, about fifty in number,
afterwards proved to be the Hull fishing fleet of England. As the
innocent character of the boats was evident and no Japanese was
seen among them, the warships passed on. The second division
had a similar experience, but, when the last division, which was
in charge of the admiral himself, came along, the circumstances,
combined with the nervous alarm of the Russians, were such as
to cause deception.
It happened that one of the Russian transports had fallen about
fifty miles behind its companions, in consequence of defective
'07 Moore: International Law Digest; see generally sections io65-
1O67. Hishida: International Position of Japan as a Great Power, 239-
274. Hershey: International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese-
IVa;, 346-359.
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,engines. The officers of that transport, on the lookout for
Japanese torpedo boats, had seen a strange vessel approaching at
.about eight o'clock in the evening (October 21), and, under an
impulse of desperation due to their sense of isolation and small
armament, fired upon it. They, then, without further investiga-
tion, sent a wireless message to the admiral, saying: "Attacked on
all sides by torpedo boats." The rumor that the Japanese were
at hand was now confirmed in the admiral's mind. He made a
calculation. His fleet was sailing at the rate of from ten to twelve
miles an hour. The torpedo boats, capable of much greater speed,
might overtake him and perhaps destroy his vessels in five hours.
He gave orders that, if the attach should come from the front,
the officer on watch should fire upon the Japanese without consult-
ing him, but, if the attack were made from the rear, he desired to
be notified. "n any event, should an attack occur, whatever ves-
sels were revealed by the search-lights of his flag-ship, should be
the commander of the fishing fleet sent up a green rocket which
meant "trawl on the starboard tack." The officer on watch on the
admiral's flag-ship who was scanning the seas for Japanese tor-
pedo boats, became suspicious. He called his comrades, and their
suspicions were increased as they looked through their night
glasses at a mysterious object in the distance. They turned on the
search-light, and there seemed to be approaching the ship, on the
starboard side at a great rate of speed, only eighteen or twenty
cable lengths distant, a Japanese torpedo boat. The firing began
by the admiral's command. A moment later, a fishing boat was
seen near the bow of the ship. This fact'being reported to the
admiral, he gave orders to turn up the search-lights at an angle
of forty-five degrees, so that the boat might not be seen, and
signaled his vessels not to fire upon trawlers. Meantime, how-
ever, suspicion was attracted to the port side of the battleship and
the search-lights revealed in that direction what appeared to be
another Japanese torpedo boat. Firing began on that side. The
search-lights were no longer confined to the admiral's ship, but
were used by the other vessels of the fleet in order to avoid sur-
prise. Great confusion followed, during which some of the Rus-
sian shots struck Russian war vessels and only strengthened
previous suspicions. But the whole affair was a mistake. No
Japanese torpedo boats were in the North Sea or in that neighbor-
hood, thousands of miles from home, and the fire of the Russian
fleet had fallen upon innocent fishermen. As a result of it, two
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fishermen were killed, and six others injured; one trawler was
sunk, -five others suffered damage by being hit, and others were
injured by the explosion of shells near them. The Russians, still
laboring under misapprehension, did not stop to make further in-
vestigations or offer relief, but continued on their course, grateful
to have escaped with slight injuries. The Russian admiral would
have been wise had he notified some of the powers of the episode,
as he passed through the British Channel, and suggested that
possibly fishermen who were near the scene of the skirmish might
need assistance, but he did not do this, nor did he make any
report until he was called upon to do so by his government, some
days later.
When the news of this disaster, which was brought by the
aggrieved fishernien, came to England, the people were aflame
with excitement. The Russian officials at the British embassy
and at St. Petersburg, still uninformed as to the facts, could offer
no explanation. For a week or more, the British cabinet ministers
were obliged to appease the anger of their people as best they
could, and seek as satisfactory a statement as they could get
from the Russian Foreign Office. The British Government made
the following demands:
That the explanation from Russia should consist of " (i) an
ample apology and disclaimer, (2) the fullest reparation to the
sufferers, (3) a searching inquiry as to blame, together with the
adequate punishment of any persons shown to be responsible, and
(4) security against the repetition of such incidents. As to the
first two points, the message of the Emperor afforded an assur-
ance that there would be no difficulty; but as to the other de-
mands, no agreement was as yet in sight, and it was as to these,
and especially the question of punishment of wrongdoers, that
public feeling in England was running high."
In order to support its position, the British Government gave
orders for the concentration of the British fleet at Gibraltar and
other points to intercept the Russian fleet should war be necessary,
and it hinted that unless the Russian fleet should call at Vigo, in
Spain, to leave officers to make a report on the incident, the two
governments might find themselves at war before the week was
over.
The correspondence continued, and, meantime, France, in a
kindly way, exercising her friendly offices, suggested resort to an
international commission of inquiry. The appropriateness of
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referring the question to such a commission had appealed strongly
both to the British Government and to the Czar. An agreement
was soon reached in the matter. An international commission
was formed consisting of admirals from the British, Russian,
United States, French, and Austrian navies, which met at Paris,
and, after going over the case carefully, made a report in Feb-
ruary, 1905. This commission found that the Russian admiral,
though there could be no reflection upon his humanity or military
qualifications, was, nevertheless, responsible for the firing upon
the fishermen. Russia accepted the decision and paid damages
to the extent of about $3oo,ooo. This settlement was final and
there was no war.
What would have happened had there been war in this case,
nobody can say, although most people would probably speculate
that, as Russia was at war at the time with Japan, and her army
and navy in poor condition, England would have won, but there
might have been a long struggle that would have caused the loss
of thousands of lives by battle and by disease and might have
cost, in money and the destruction of property, hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars, to pay which the people of Great Britain and
Russia might have been taxed for years.* As the affair turned
out, only two men were killed and a few others wounded; only
one ship was sunk and a few others injured. The money cost
was only about $300,ooo. This solution shows the advantage of
settling international difficulties on the basis of reason and
justice instead of the basis of passion and force, and it has
established the success of the international commission of inquiry
as a part of our machinery for the preservation of internationar
peace. The case further shows that questions of honor and vital
interest can be taken up by an international commission of inquiry
with safety to the parties concerned.-
Of this incident, Professor Moore said, at the 'Mohonk Arbitra-
tion Conference of 1905:
A day or two ago the question was discussed here as to the
desirableness or necessity of excluding from arbitration questions
of national honor or questions of vital interest; but I venture to.
" John Bassett Moore: Mohonk Arbitration Conference Report, 19o5,
143. Hershey: International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese~
War, 217. Higgins: The Hague Peace Conferences, 167-170. 2 American
Journal of International Law, 929, for the finding of the international
commission of inquiry.
THE HAGUE PEACE SYSTEM
say that in this North Sea incident there were involved both ques-
tions of national honor and questions of vital interest. Surely
nothing can more affect the honor or the interests of a govern-
ment than the wrongful taking of the lives of its people, especially
where they are assailed at the hands of the officials of a foreign
power. Not only is the arbitral settlement of the North Sea in-
cident a proof of the growth in the world of a magnanimous and
enlightened spirit, but it is to be placed among the great cases in
which that mode of settlement has brought peace, with honor, to
the lasting benefit of the powers immediately concerned and to the
great advantage of the whole world. 12
The procedure developed by this international commission of
inquiry was reported to the Second Hague Conference, and was,
in substance, adopted by it as a suggestion for future use in
similar cases.
THE HAGUE COURT.13
For some time after the permanent court was created and its
panel of judges appointed, there was a feeling that it might never
be used. One of the reasons why provision was not made for the
12 -. ohonk Arblration Report, i9o5, i50.
13 THE HAGUE COURT CASES.
(i) The Pious Fund Case. United States of America v..the United
Mexican States. Protocol signed at Washington, May 22, 19o2. Decision
at The Hague, October 14, 1902. Arbitrators designated by the President
of the United States-Sir Edward Fry (Great Britain), and Dr. F. De
Martens (Russia) ; designated by the President of Mexico-Dr. T. M. C.
Asser (Netherlands), and Dr. J. A. F. de Savornin Lohman (Nether-
lands), who met and chose as umpire and president, Dr. Henning Matzen
(Denmark). 2 An. Jour. Int. Law, 893. See a readable and informing
account of this case by Hon. William L. Penfield: The Hague Court in the
Pious Fund Arbitration, Mohonk Arbitration Report, 19o3, 83. See for a
discussion of the first two cases and of proposed improvements in the
court, John W. Foster: Arbitration and the Hague Court, chapters 5
and 6. Cf. also J. H. Ralston: Some Suggestions as to the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in i Am. Jour. Int. Law, 321. Penfield again on
International Courts of Justice: Penn. Arb. and Peace Conf. Report,
19o, 59. United States vs. Mexico-Report of Jackson H. Ralston, Agent
of the United States and of Counsel, in the matter of the Pious Fund of
the Californias, published as Senate Document No. 28, 57th Congress, 21nd
Session.
(2) The Venezuela Preferential Payment Case. Germany, Great
Britain, and Italy v. Fenezuela et als. Protocols signed at Washington,
Feb. 13, 1903, and May 7, 19o3. Decision at The Hague, Feb. 22, 1904.
Arbitrators named by the Czar of Russia at the request of the interested
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court to go into regular annual session was a fear entertained by
the members of the First Hague Conference that, if it should hold
sessions, but have no cases, it would be discredited in the public
estimation as a farce. The court, however, was destined to live
and not to die. It was given its first case through the influence of
President Roosevelt. This is known as the Pious Fund Case.
The trial of this case showed how the new institution worked.
The case has a history. In the latter part of the seventeenth and
early part of the eighteenth century, some good people of Spain
gave in trust to the Society of Jesus about $i,7oo,ooo for the
conversion of heathen in California. When the Jesuit order
was excluded from Spain (1767), and suppressed by the Pope
powers-Mr. N. V. Mouravieff (Russia), Dr. H. Lammasch (Austria-
Hungary), and Dr. F. de Martens (Russia). Mr. Mouravieff elected
president. 2 Ant. Jour. Int. Law, 902. See address by Hon. William L.
Penfield, Mohawk Arbitration Report, 1904, 35.
(3) The Japanese House Tax Case. Great Britain, France, and
Germany v. Japan. Protocol signed at Tokyo, August 28, 1902. Decision
at The Hague, May 22, j9o5. Arbitrators designated by the governments
of Germany, France, and Great Britain-Professor Louis Renault
(France), by the government of Japan-Dr. Itchiro Motono; who elected
as umpire Mr. Gregers Gram of Norway. 2 A11. Jour. Int. Law, 9m1.
(4) The Muscat Dhows Case. Great Britain v. France. Protocol
signed at London, October 13, I9O4. Decision at The Hague, August 8,
i9o5. Arbitrators designated by the government of Great Britain-Hon.
Melville W. Fuller (United States); by the government of France-Dr.
J. A. F. De Savornin Lohman (Netherlands). Professor H. Lammasch
was, by agreement, chosen umpire by the King of Italy, the arbitrators
having failed within a month to choose an umpire themselves. 2 .Am.
Jour. Iut. Law, 921.
(5) The Casablanca Case. France v. Germany. Protocols signed
November io and 24, i9o8. Decision at The Hague, May 22, 1909. Arbi-
trators designated by the government of the French Republic-Sir Edward
Fry (Great Britain), and Professor Louis Renault (France) ; by the Im-
perial German government, Dr. Guido Fusinato (Italy) ; Dr. Kriege (Ger-
many), who met and chose as umpire Dr. K. Hj. L. de Hammarskjold
(Sweden). 3 Am. Journ. Int. Law, 755.
(6) The Maritime Boundary Case. Norway v. Sweden. Convention,
March 14, i9oS. Decision at The Hague, October 23, I9O9. Arbitrators
and umpire designated by the governments-Dr.' J. A. Loeff (Nether-
lands), president; Mr. F. V. N. Beichmann (Norway) ; Dr. K. Hj. L. de
Hammarskjold (Sweden). 4 An. Jour. Int. Law, 226.
(7) The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case. United States of
America v,. Great Britain. Protocol signed at Washington January 27,
x9o9. Decision at The Hague September 7, x9Io. Arbitrators designated
by the United States-Hon. George Gray (United States), and Dr. Luis
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(1773), the Spanish Government took over the fund and ad-
ministered it for the donors. Later, when the government of
Mexico was established, it succeeded to the fund, merged it with
other national funds, and paid a regular annuity on it to the
Catholic Church authorities in California. After the cession
of California to the United States at the close of the Mexican
War, the American Catholic authorities in California claimed the
annuities enjoyed by their predecessors. Being unable to get
them, they appealed to the United States Government for its in-
tervention. The matter of the claim was referred, in 1869, to a
mixed commission appointed to settle cross claims between the
two countries. The commissioners disagreed as to the claim
which was then referred to Sir Edward Thornton as umpire,
M. Drago (Argentine Republic; by Great Britain, Dr. J. A. F. De Savornin
Lohman (Netherlands), Sir Charles Fitzpatrick (Canada), who met and
chose Prof. Lammasch (Austria-Hungary) as president. 3 Ant. Jour.
Int. Law, Supplement, i68, for special agreement. 4 An. Jour. Int. Law,
948, for decision. One of the most helpful articles on this case is that of
Robert Lansing, The North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, in 5 Am. Jour.
it. Law, i, to which the writer is specially indebted.
(8) The Orinoco Steamship Company Case. The United States v.
Venezuela. Protocol signed at Caracas February 13, 1909. Decision at
The Hague, October 25, i9IO. Arbitrators designated by the United States
-His Excellency, Al. Gonzalo de Queseda y Arostegui (Cuba); by
\Venezuela-His Excellency, A. Beernaert (Belgium), who met and chose
Prof. H. Lammasch, as president. 3 Ant. Jour. Int. Law, supplement 224,
for protocol. 5 Am. Jour. Int. Law, 230, for decision. See also address of
Dr. Lammasch upon the opening of the tribunal, 5 Am. Jour. Int. Law, 32,
and a valuable historical and legal article, with a discussion of the de-
velopments in the procedure of the court, by Hon. William Cullen Dennis.
The Orinoco Steamship Case before the Hague Tribunal, the same, 35.
(9) The Savarkar Case. France v. Great Britain. Protocol signed
at London, October 25, I9io. Decision at The Hague, February 24, 1911.
Arbitrators designated by the governments, one of whom should be a
national of each, Mr. A. Beernaert (Belgium), president; the Earl of
Desart (Great Britain); Prof. Louis Renault (France); Mr. Gregers
Gram (Norway) ; Dr. J. A. F. De Savornin Lohman (Netherlands). 5
Ant. Jour. Int. Law, supplement, 37, for protocol. 5 Anl. Jour. Int. Law,
520, for decision. An editorial on this case will be found in 5 Am. Jour.
Int. Law, 208.
In general, for introductory matter on the Hague Court cases, see the
American Journal of Interiational Law, and the Advocate of Peace. The
New York Independent and the Outlook have frequently printed editorials,
or other articles, by leading writers of the day on international disputes
as they have arisen, or in connection with the decisions of the Hague
Court. For full details, see Government Reports.
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who in 1875 awarded to the United States Government twenty-
one annuities of $43,050.99 each up to 1869. The Mexican
Government paid the award, but declared that it constituted a
final settlement. -The church authorities, on the other hand,
maintained that the annuities should continue and again asked the
assistance of the United States Government to secure them.
Correspondence between the Mexican and the American Govern-
ments resulted in disagreement. It was at this point, on March
13, i9o2, while the Hague Court was lying idle, that President
Roosevelt suggested, through Secretary Hay and Ambassador
Clayton to the Mexican Government, that the two greatest Amer-
ican republics ought to have the honor of giving the Hague Court
its first case, and should avail themselves of the opportunity open
to them before any other nations should take advantage of it.
The suggestion was adopted. A tribunal was chosen from the
Hague panel, none of whose members was, however, a subject of
the litigating states.
The question was put to the tribunal whether the claim of the
United States, based on Sir Edward Thornton's award, was
within the governing principle of res judicata, and, if not whether
it was just; the tribunal to render a just and equitable award.
The arguments were duly presented before the court at the
Hague and, in a short time, a decision was made that the award
was governed by the principle of res judicata, as contended by
the United States, and MLfexico was held responsible for a con-
tinuance of the annuities. The United Mexican States were
ordered to pay to the United States of America $1,42o,682.67 in
accumulated annuities, and $43,050.99, perpetually, on the second
day of February, in lexican legal currency. The decision of
the Hague Court settled the differences to the satisfaction of
both parties to the controversy. It reaffirmed res judicata as a
principle of international law, but, more than that, established
the international court in the public confidence.
The case is also interesting from the fact that it throws light
upon the procedure used before the Hague Court. Mr. Penfield,
counsel for the United States, speaking of this at the Mohonk
Conference of 1903 (Report, p. 87), observed:
That the issues submitted by the arbitrating states to the -lague
Court were joined and tried in essentially the same manner as the
issues in law-suits before the municipal courts.
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There is, first, the transaction which begets the controversy.
This results in conflicting contentions and arguments between the
parties until the ultimate issues of law and fact are evolved and
reduced to written form. Then the case is brought before the
appointed court, to whom the statements of the case and the evi-
dence on either side are submitted. On the hearing, the one
having the affirmative opens and is followed by the adversary.
The court holds stated sessions, decides incidental questions of
procedure, finally declares the hearings closed, then deliberates
and renders solemn judgment. In short, the principles of judicial
procedure are essentially the same, whether before the Roman
praetor, the civil courts of Germany, France, Italy, Spain or
South America, or before the English or American judge or
magistrate, or the supreme court of the state, or the supreme
court of nations.
Two other cases soon came before the court which were of
less significance, but tended to perpetuate it as a regular institu-
tion. One of these, the Japanese house Tax Case, was between
Great Britain, France, and Germany on the one side, and Japan
on the other. It was a question of taxation which related to the
interpretation of treaties and other engagements by which these
foreign governments held property under perpetual leases in the
foreign concessions of Japan. The decision was rendered that,
under the leases in question, not only were the lands, leased by
foreigners in the concessions, but the buildings as well, ex-
empted from taxation. In this case the Japanese arbitrator dis-
sented.
Disputes having arisen between France and Great Britain
over the extent to which the subjects of the Sultan of Muscat
might, under an agreement made March IO, 1862, use the French
flag on their vessels, and the nature and extent of other privileges
granted, a case was made up for the court.
The decision defined the limits and conditions under which the
Dhows were authorized to fly the French flag. As it had been
alleged that the French flag was wrongly used to protect illegal
trade in arms and slaves, serious trouble had been caused between
the British and French governments, "which," says Dr. Darby
(International Tribunals, page 9o6), "sometimes brought the two
Powers within an ace of war."
Both cases showed that the court could successfully deal with
the interpretation of treaties.
A more notable case than-either of these was that known as
the Venezuela Preferential Payment Case. Germany, Great
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Britain, and Italy held diplomatic claims against Venezuela for
unpaid interest on public debts due their bond holders for money
lent for building railways, other works of a public nature, special
contracts, and on account of claims for injuries to their subjects
during the disorders of revolutions. Germany proposed arbitra-
tion. Venezuela refused. Great Britain also proposed arbitra-
tion, but her offer was rejected. Italy wanted her claims adjusted,
but was willing to accept the decision of a mixed commission.
The offer was ignored. But it should be said that Venezuela in-
sisted that her own laws were conclusive as to the matters in
dispute.
Notice was given to the United States by Germany that it
was her intention to blockade Venezuelan ports to enforce her
-claims, but it was expressly stated that there was no intention of
taking territory. The United States Government made no ob-
jection at the course of action determined upon, but refused to
acquiesce when Germany. joined by Great Britain and Italy,
established an anomalous pacific blockade. The form of the
blockade was then changed from pacific to hostile, applied to all
nations in the usual way, and was duly recognized by their atti-
tude of neutrality. Within a day or two after the blockade be-
gan, Venezuela offered herself to arbitrate, but her belated
courtesy was ignored. At this point, the government of Vene-
zuela, assisted by the advice of her plenipotentiary, Herbert AV.
Bowen, agreed to assign, in payment of her debts to Germany,
Great Britain and Italy, duties to the extent of thirty per cent
from its customs receipts of La Guaira and Puerto Cabello, and
made some payments to those powers.
Other powers who had claims against Venezuela made peaceful
demands for their share of payments. The question then arose
whether the blockading powers should be given preference. The
powers offered to refer the question to President Roosevelt, but
he again proposed resort to the Hague Court. The case went to
it and was decided in favor of the blockading powers, but the
matter of the actual value of the respective claims of all the
creditor powers was, by agreement, submitted to mixed commis-
sions, consisting of one national each, of Venezuela and the
claimant nation, with a neutral as umpire, which met at Caracas
and subsequently reported their awards.
Some question arose later as to the ethics of the decision.
The statement was made that it put a premium on war-like
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methods instead of peaceful recourse to the law, but the critics
of the court perhaps forgot that, in the present state of inter-
national law, a hostile blockade is a legitimate operation just as
war itself is still legitimate, to which no protest was made by
any of the interested peaceful powers before it was instituted,
though notice of it had been given in advance. The judges in
their decision took pains to point out this lack of protest by the
non-blockading powers.
Professor Moore, at Lake Iohank, in commenting upon this
decision (Report, 1904, p. 64), says:
In judicially deciding, therefore, that the blockading powers
had by their forcible action acquired preferential position, which,
but for their agreeing to submit the question to arbitration, they
would have gone on to make effective, the Hague Tribunal
merely declared and applied, as it was in duty bound to do, the
existing international law. The Hague Tribunal is a judicial,
not a legislative, body.
The moral aspect of this case was perhaps even more im-
portant than the legal. The fact was that three heavily armed
powers had raised their hands and were about to strike a blow,
when an agreement was reached by which it was possible to
avoid serious hostilities by submitting the issue involved to the
Haoue Court. Not only that, but eleven nations, thirteen in-
cluding Russia and Austria, who furnished the judges, represent-
ing about four hundred and fifty million people, committed them-
selves at one time to the use of the court for a peaceful settle-
ment instead of war.
Speaking at a meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, when the imperfections of the Hague Court were
under discussion, Mr. MacVeagh said of its decision in the
Venezuelan Case, in which he was counsel:
That, while much can be said in criticism of the tribunal, and
especially of the conduct of Mr. Mouravieff, who presided over
it, and certainly much can be said as to the inaccuracy of its
findings of fact as the basis for its decision, still, as I said then,
when it was just over, and as I say now, such arbitration was of
inestimable benefit to the peace of the world. Here were three
great nations, with their war ships in the Caribbean Sea, blockad-
ing the ports of a weak South American republic, and that
blockade was lifted when the arbitration was agreed upon, and
those ships went home, never, I trust, again to cross the sea on
such an errand. The selection of arbitrators happened to be
unwise-two Russian diplomats and one Austrian diplomat were
not likely to regard with favor the protest of Venezuela against
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the masterful conduct of Great Britain and Germany. But it
was infinitely better for the world and its peace and its true pros-
perity that the question should be referred to such a tribunal-
notwithstanding its mistakes of procedure, notwithstanding its
mistakes in its findings of fact, notwithstanding its mistakes in
its conclusions-infinitely better that it should be referred to the
peaceful arbitrament of such a tribunal than that the United
States should have been required, as she soon would have been
required by the rising tide of indignation in the land, to order
those fleets home. So I beg you to believe that among all the
signs of a brighter day, among all the signs of the renaissance of
the moral law, retaking its true place in the government of
nations, no sign seems to me of better or brighter omen than the
establishment of the court of arbitration at The Hague. With
all its imperfections, with all its defects, it still stands there a
signal to all peoples that here, in some halting, imperfect way,
you can have a peaceful solution of your differences. 14
A few years ago, it would have been thought a crazy notion
of the peace advocates had anybody suggested that a dispute
between France and Germany, on a sensitive point of honor,
could be referred to a court of arbitration, but a tribunal at the
Hague settled to satisfaction a remarkable case of this kind in
19o9. It is known as the Casablanca Incident.
Six soldiers from the French foreign legion in Morocco de-
serted, and secured by improper means a safe conduct home
from the German consul. They were forcibly taken from his
protection by French soldiers who arrested them September 25,
19o8, having threatened and fired upon the native Moroccan
guard who bad the men in charge.
Diplomatic representatives of the two governments failing to
come to a satisfactory understanding, the dispute was referred
to the Hague Court. The tribunal partook somewhat of the
character of an international commission of inquiry. It was em-
powered to decide questions of law and fact, and authorized to
go, or send a delegate, to the scene of the incident in order to
secure facts if necessary.
The decision of the tribunal implicated both sides in technical
errors, but it was couched in language that could offend the
honor of neither nation. The substance of it was that the Ger-
man consul should not have given safe conduct to the deserters,
but that the French military authorities should have endeavored,
'4 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 19o9,
50-51.
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as far as possible, to obtain possession of the deserters without
the use of force, the excessive display of which, on this occasion,
was criticised. The deserters, however, were left in possession
of the French, the tribunal not passing judgment upon this point,
and each governments, according to previous agreement, apolo-
gized to the other for its mistakes.
Among the more recent cases taken up and successfully dis-
posed of by the Hague Court have been those submitted by
Sweden and Norway, after their separation, relating to a disputed
boundary; by the United States and Venezuela in regard to the
claims of the Orinoco Steamship Company, and by Great Britain
and France in connection with a point of law as to the legality of
the surrender of an Indian prisoner, Vinayak Damodar Savar-
kar, who escaped from British detectives while in their custody
on a British steamship in the harbor of Marselles, and was im-
mediately, but informally, returned to them by local police with-
out first being handed over to the chief of the harbor police. The
Orinoco Steamship Company case, the only one of these cases to
which there is opportunity to refer, except by name, was be-
tween the United States and Venezuela. Like the Pious Fund
Case, it related to an arbitral award already made, but, in this
instance, the valid part of the award was allowed to stand, while
the invalid part was tried anew, on its merits. This was pur-
suant to an agreement by the two governments that the previous
question of the validity of the award should first be passed upon
by the tribunal, "in view of all the circumstances and under the
principles of international law." The ground of invalidity was
departure from the terms of the protocol, an essential error, that
is, a denial of justice, under which the case was originally sub-
mitted by the United States and Venezuela to Dr. Barge, the
umpire of the United States and Venezuela Claims Commission
of 19o3. The amount originally claimed was about $1,4oo,ooo.
The sum granted was $92,607.52 against $28,224.93 originally
allowed by Dr. Barge. The court held itself unable to review on
the merits the largest claims involved, but on such claims as were
reviewed on the merits, the court allowed about two-thirds of the
amount claimed.
."Turning from the financial to the legal aspect of the de-
cision," writes M%,r. Dennis, the agent of the United States, "the
all-important thing about the decision is that for the first time
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an international award has been annulled by an nternational
tribunal." 15
- These cases show a growing tendency of the governments to
refer to the court a variety of difficulties. Some of these had
already led to bad feeling and might, without adjustment, have
become dangerous irritants between the peoples, represented by
the governments, and formed a part of an accumulation of
grievances liable to be recalled in a moment of national passion,
over some new and unexpected incident. Failure to pay debts,
as already seen in the first case of Venezuela, has led to
the use of the military arm, but this is not all. The use of the
court is not only for the prevention of war, but for the upholding
of justice, without which a scheme for the prevention of war
might, on some grounds, become open to criticism. The fact that
the court secures justice where otherwise justice might be de-
layed or never realized, with war or without war; this aspect
of the Hague peace system, peace with justice, is a virtue that
cannot fail to commend it even to believers in war for virtue's
sake. This point is more particularly illustrated by the Fisheries
Case, which, from its historic nature, deserves more extended
consideration.
The settlement by the Hague Court of the North Atlantic
fisheries question closed a controversy that had perplexed British
and American statesmen, at different times, for seventy years.
By the treaty of peace, 1783, practically all the British coasts
of North America were left open to American fishermen to dry
fish on, except those of Newfoundland, but Americans were al-
lowed to take fish in all British coastal waters, as had been the
custom in colonial days. When, however, at the close of the war of
1812, terms of peace were made at Ghent, the British Government
asserted, and the United States commissioners denied, that the
war had abrogated the fisheries article of the former treaty, and
no mention of the fisheries was made in that treaty. The action
of British war vessels led to vehement protests and threats of war.
Diplomatic correspondence followed, at the end of which both
parties came to an agreement by the treaty of London, i8iS, the
first article of which relates to the fisheries. By this treaty, it
was agreed that the United States should have perpetual liberty
to take fish on certain coasts of Newfoundland and the Magdalen
13 5 Am. rour. Jit. Law, 54.
THE HAGUE PEACE SYSTEM
Islands, and on certain coasts of Labrador, in common with
British subjects. The treaty also gave the American fishermen
the liberty to dry and cure fish on certain'unsettled shores within
limits described on the Newfoundland and Labrador coasts, sub-
ject to agreement with inhabitants and proprietors whenever, in
the future, those shores should be settled. The United States
renounced their liberty before enjoyed, or claimed, to take or dry
or cure fish within three marine miles of any other of the
coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of his Majesty's Dominions in
America, but it was agreed that American fishermen might enter
such waters "for the purpose of shelter and repairing damage
therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtaining water, and for no
other purpose whatever." And it was provided that regulations
be made to prevent the abuse of such privileges granted on
these, sometimes called the non-treaty, coasts.
If there was a marked difference between the fisheries pro-
visions of the treaty of 1783 and those of i8i8, it was due, in
part, to the fact that conditions had changed in the interval,
owing to the settlement and growth of the British colonies af-
fected by the treaties, and the value to those colonies of the local
fisheries, of which they had begun to make use. The treaty of
i8iS was well calculated to recognize these changes, but, as Mr.
Robert Lansing who has written a very able account of the
fisheries case, observes, it did not consider future growth. In-
deed, had it done so there might never have been a fisheries arbi-
tration. Conditions continued to change, especially in New-
foundland, which in early days was practically a closed country
to settlers, but which in late years has been opened up to settle-
ment. Inhabitants of Newfoundland and the Traritime Provinces
began to look upon their enterprising New England rivals with
jealous eyes, and, in the case of Newfoundland, with good rea-
son, because the fisheries were their sole dependence, and, in
any event, deserved proper protection.
Considerable irritation arose which finally led, on the" part of
Canada, but more particularly Newfoundland, to the making of
rigorous local laws, by which Americans were seriously restricted
as to days, seasons, and the manner of taking fish. They were
penalized for shipping Newfoundland fishermen, and were made
to enter and clear at customs houses, although these houses were
at a long distance from the scene of fishing, and although the
fishermen were not engaged in trading. American fishermen
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were also compelled to pay light and harbor dues. Similar re-
quirements were made of American fishing vessels resorting to
non-treaty coasts for the legitimate purpose of making repairs,
seeking shelter, and obtaining wood and water.
Although the irritation of the early days was allayed by the
reciprocity treaties of 1854 and 1871, and, although since the
failure of the Bayard-Chamberlain treaty of i888 from non-
ratification by the Senate, peaceful and, to a certain extent, satis-
factory relations had been maintained by a system of licenses
granted by both Canada and Newfoundland, an oppressive
and discriminating statute was made by Newfoundland against
American fishermen in 1905. Diplomatic correspondence, be-
tween Great Britain and the United States, followed, pending the
result of which American fishermen visited Newfoundland coasts
-under a modus vivendi. War was not threatening, but con-
tinuous friction, liable to lead to dangerous trouble, and to cause
serious financial loss to the fishing interests of the United States,
made a settlement desirable.
The case was finally referred for settlement to the Hague
Court under the present arbitration treaty with Great Britain by
special agreement of January 27, 1909. Seven questions, pre-
pared in the light of the vexatious differences of the past, were
submitted to the tribunal, which in effect, called for a detailed
interpretation of the fisheries article of the treaty of iSiS, which
was still in force.
The principal question related to the reasonableness of the
fisheries regulations. The United States, conceiving that they
enjoyed the liberty of the fisheries in common with British sub-
jects, though under limitations defined by the treaty, believed they
should be consulted when regulations were made, and that their
concurrence was necessary to the enforcement of the regulations.
This question involved the sovereignty of Great Britain and she
denied the contention of the United States. The tribunal, on the
point of law, decided for Great Britain, and, therefore, technically
saved her sovereignty which otherwise would have been im-
paired, but ruled that the regulations should be reasonable and
equitable, and that, in case of disagreement as to their reason-
ableness or fairness, the points at issue should be referred to a
special body of experts consisting of one subject of each party,
with a neutral to act as umpire; the procedure to be similar to
that provided for in summary cases by the Hague Conference of
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i9o7. The tribunal decided that the words "inhabitants of the
United States" in the treaty of i818 did not prevent the prosecu-
tion of the fishery by the employment of Newfoundland and
other foreign fishermen. It decided that American fishing ves-
sels, going to a treaty coast to fish, or to dry and cure fish; or
to non-treaty coasts for shelter, repairs, wood, or water, should
not be required to enter and clear at customs houses, but recom-
mended that they should report their presence, if convenient
means were at hand to do so: namely, a customs house or a cus-
toms official who could be reached by telegraph, and declared that
light and harbor dues should not be charged unless Newfound-
land fishermen were also required to pay them.
The tribunal was asked to pass upon the historic question of
the "three mile limit" (question five), but, though it overthrew
the contention of the United States, it did so only in a qualified
form. It decided that the word "bays," as used in the treaty of
x818, meant those bodies of water commonly known and charted
as bays at that time, and did not mean bays, six miles wide
at the mouth, or jurisdictional bays, as claimed by the United
States; and, as international law in i818 did not definitely fix the
point at which a bay terminated and the high seas began, the
tribunal laid down no definite rule. It suggested, however, that
the principle of the North Sea Convention, that the high sea
should terminate and a bay begin where the shores first approach
each other within ten miles, should be adopted, but excepted from
this recommendation such bays as deeply indented his Majesty's
Dominions, and suggested that their limits be arbitrarily defined
along the lines of the unratified Bayard-Chamberlain treaty of
1888. Examples of such bays are Chaleur, Placentia, Egemont,
and Fortune. Dr. Drago, who in an ably written opinion, dis-
sented from this view, asserted that the ten mile limit should be
established as a part of the decision, and not as a recommenda-
tion.1" Of this question (five), it is felt that the tribunal failed
to make a practical solution. A special contention of the govern-
ment of Newfoundland that the wording of the treaty precluded
the American fishermen from entering the bays, creeks, harbors,
etc., of Newfoundland on the treaty coasts, as the words "bays,
harbors, and creeks" were not expressly used in the treaty in
regard to Newfoundland by itself, was denied by the tribunal
16 4 All. Jour. Int. Law, 988.
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The effect of this particular decision is of great importance to the
winter herring fishing of the United States, which otherwise,
under the ingenious restrictive interpretation of Sir Robert Bond,
•might' have been ruined or seriously crippled.
The tribunal decided that the inhabitants of the United States
may engage in trade or fishing on the treaty coasts, but may not
use both privileges on the same voyage. This decision, however,
does not prevent a vessel from going to the treaty coasts for
trading purposes, and having finished its business, engaging,
under license, in fishing on the homeward voyage.
The decision of the tribunal, on one point of question one, and
on question five, denied the contention of the United States, and
gave to the government of Great Britain a technical victory, sav-
ing its sovereignty; but, on the second contention of question one,
and on five other questions, declared a rule in favor of the
United States. From an industrial point of view, the United
States gained a substantial victory, as the tribunal required that
fisheries regulations should, hereafter, be reasonable and fair,
and admitted American fishermen to Newfoundland waters from
which an attempt was made to debar them. The decision, how-
ever, has proved acceptable to both governments and to their
peoples. The case will stand with the Geneva award in the
category of the greatest of international arbitrations.
The fisheries arbitration and the eight arbitrations of the
Hague Court, in about one decade of its existence, the use of
the international commission of inquiry in dealing with the
North Sea incident, and the mediation of President Roosevelt in
the war between Russia and Japan, have shown that some
features of the t-ague peace system have already proved their
practical success, and justified belief in the feasibility of the sys-
tem as a whole.
James L. Tryon.
